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Abstract: In understanding Malaysia’s surprise 14th General Election, this 
article argues for the need to rethink how we understand elections. We 
need to bring together macro socio-political forces with more micro-level 
evolving phenomena in the campaign, within political institutions, and in 
voting behaviour. Rather than buck international trends, Malaysia’s socio-
political conditions before the election – political polarisation, a rise of 
anger, increasing economic vulnerabilities, as well as increased nationalist 
and populist sentiments – echoed global trends and served as fertile 
ground for political change. It was however three sufficient conditions 
that brought about the political breakthrough: the impact of emotional 
campaigning through social media, the deinstitutionalisation of the domi-
nant Malay party, United Malays National Organisation, and the failure to 
win over young voters – all factors that tie closely with the macro forces 
shaping the country. Given the factors that shaped the electoral outcome 
and Malaysia’s “saviour politics,” it is suggested that the government turn-
over was more about breaking with the past than embracing democracy. 
As such, there will be constraints placed on expanding democracy going 
forward.  
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Malaysia’s 14th General Election (GE14), held on 9 May 2018, resulted in 
the first turnover of federal government in the country’s history. The in-
cumbent Barisan Nasional (National Front, or BN) led by Najib Tun Ra-
zak lost power to a coalition, led by former prime minister Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad, known as Pakatan Harapan (Coalition of Hope, or PH). PH 
won 121 seats with its coalition partner Warisan, a regional-based party 
from the state of Sabah, while BN only captured 79 seats, the majority 
held by the former dominant party of Malaysia – the United Malays Na-
tional Organisation (UMNO). While most analysts did not predict that a 
turnover would be possible, given the obstacles in an unfair electoral sys-
tem and ratcheted-up repression from 2015 (Human Rights Watch 2015; 
2016), the opposition was nevertheless able to make a breakthrough and 
rupture the hold BN had had on power since 1957. As such GE14 has 
been couched as bucking international trends, as it represents a democratic 
breakthrough in the face of rising global authoritarianism.  
What made this turnover possible? Is it in fact a deviation from the 
global norm? What does GE14 mean for the future of democracy in Ma-
laysia? Analysts have adopted a variety of explanations to account for elec-
toral behaviour in Malaysia, and these have already been applied to GE14. 
The dominant explanatory framework revolves around the role of Ma-
hathir, Malaysia’s former prime minister from 1981 to 2003, who left his 
party in 2016 and led the opposition to victory (Abdullah 2018; Krishna-
moorthy 2018). Others (Suffian 2018) focus their attention on Najib, 
whose deep unpopularity served to alienate many within his own party and 
large sections of the public at large. Najib’s involvement in the world’s 
largest kleptocracy scandal to date, 1Malaysia Development Berhad 
(1MDB), was an integral part of voter alienation, especially in urban areas 
(Gabriel 2018; Steiner 2017; Wright and Hope 2018). The analytical focus 
has, thus, been primarily on the role of individuals and leaders, in keeping 
with what is arguably the dominant paradigm for understanding Malaysian 
politics as a whole. As part of an effort to “Save Malaysia,” Mahathir has 
been described as the country’s “saviour” bringing back the country from 
poor leadership and towards a different future.  
Malaysia’s GE14 democratic breakthrough merits further exploration, 
not only because it calls into question different heuristic tools for under-
standing the country’s elections but also because it shapes projections for 
future trajectories for democracy in Malaysia (and arguably elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia). In this article I argue that in order to have a more com-
prehensive understanding of why the 2018 electoral turnover occurred we 
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need to appreciate how broader societal shifts created necessary condi-
tions for a political rupture with the past, and also the factors that were 
unique (sufficient) in GE14 to bring about the change in government. I 
identify three important sufficient factors: the combination of modern 
campaigning with emotions, the institutional collapse of dominant party 
UMNO leading to the erosion of its traditional base, and the failure of the 
government to effectively win over young voters. I illustrate these factors 
and their synergies with underlying socio-political conditions using an 
analysis of local polling station data of the results, and draw from months 
of fieldwork involving focus groups across Malaysia both before and after 
the 2018 election.1 In pointing to the combined focus on social conditions 
and their nexus with the campaign, I further argue for the need to rethink 
how we understand voters and voting behaviour – namely, to do so in a 
more holistic manner. In fact I suggest that, given the factors that brought 
about political change, “saving Malaysia” may not promise the level of 




The study of elections in Malaysia is arguably the richest area of political 
science research in the country (Welsh 2015). Every election leads to mul-
tiple publications, drawing from a variety of different perspectives. This 
special issue follows this tradition. Theoretically, the explanations can 
been differentiated into five interrelated arenas of focus: 1) agency (role of 
leadership and opposition pact-making); 2) rules of the game (electoral 
system, three-corner contests, coalitions structures); 3) campaign mobili-
sation (money (patronage), machinery and media environment) and policy 
engagement); 4) voting behaviour shifts (usually along ethnic and regional 
lines); and, 5) broader socio-political features (regionalism, demography, 
class structure, and globalisation). Of these, the last is perhaps the least 
developed – and thus a dimension that is particularly elaborated on in my 
own argument below. 

1  Special thanks to my research assistant Chong Hua Kueh for work with the data 
analysis. The local polling station analysis is based on findings for all of Malaysia 
and uses ecological interference, while the focus groups were conducted 
throughout the country from April to August 2018.  
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Let me unpack the different frameworks further. 2  The focus on 
agency centres on the role of individuals, usually those leading a campaign. 
When Abdullah Badawi assumed the leadership mantle of BN, his maiden 
2004 election was tied to him. Similarly, and more recently, Adenan Sa-
tem’s role as chief minister in Sarawak was credited to his personality and 
engagement in BN’s victory in the 2016 Sarawak state elections (Chin 2016; 
Weiss and Puyok 2016). Usually the focus is on the persona and the timing 
of their leadership, coming after a long-serving leader – Mahathir and Taib 
Mahmud in the two examples noted above. Yet, analysis has also included 
the feudal ties and networks of the leader as well. Both Anwar Ibrahim 
and Mahathir, for example, have been credited with their bridging of social 
capital in the formation of a more unified opposition in the general elec-
tion of 2013 (GE13) and in GE14, respectively (Lemiere 2018; Diamond 
2018; Hutchinson 2018; Rahim 2018). This fits with tradition pact-making 
approaches looking at how decisions shape electoral outcomes. The focus 
on agency implicitly brings with it a top-down approach to politics.  
The second framework, prioritising the rules of the game, looks at 
institutional arrangements. Within this rubric, there have been two areas 
that have received the most attention: coalition formation and electoral 
systems. Scholars have argued that the restructured arrangements in Ma-
laysia’s political coalitions have affected their electoral support. This is true 
of BN, which has experienced an erosion of support with a weakening of 
the non-Malay political parties within the coalition, and for the opposition 
PH in its various forms from 2008 (Pakatan Rakyat to Pakatan Harapan) 
(Weiss 2018). The cooperation and representativeness of the coalitions 
shaped their electoral viability. With the prominence of the Bersih elec-
toral reform movement since 2007, increasingly scholars have paid atten-
tion to the impact of the electoral system and its management on electoral 
outcomes (Wong, Chin, and Othman 2010; Ooi 2018; Ong 2018; Oswald 
2018). In fact, the inability of Pakatan Rakyat to win GE13 was blamed on 
gerrymandering and other controls of the electoral process (Oswald 2013). 
In GE14, the role of three-corner fights was hotly contested, with this 
arrangement seen to favour BN as the entry of the Islamic party PAS was 
seen to take away votes from the opposition. As other essays in this special 
issue show, this did not occur as this dynamic favoured PAS more than 
BN and did not necessarily undermine PH’s fortunes to the extent pre-
dicted. This focus on how elections are contested – the players and pro-
cess – has gained more attention in recent years.  

2  Space considerations do not allow for a thorough literature review of the election 
scholarship. The focus is on providing examples, as illustrations of these differ-
ent approaches.  
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The third framework, focused on campaigns and engagement with 
voters, has been the more traditional explanation of Malaysian scholars. 
The term “3Ms” has long been used to describe Malaysian elections: 
namely, money, media, and mobilisation. In the past, there was a fourth 
“M” – Mahathir. This approach, focusing on the interaction between vot-
ers and BN, has also acknowledged the important role that the state plays 
in distributing patronage and projects. Works within this framework cen-
tre on “developmentalism,” and credit BN’s control of states in East Ma-
laysia to the power of the “development” purse (Loh 2014). The use of 
state resources in campaigns has included vote-buying, and debates have 
addressed changes in the patterns of patronage – to the use of government 
revenues rather than party coffers (Welsh 2013a, 2013b; Weiss 2016). 
Underscoring these interventions is the government’s management 
of the economy, and the policies and alliances that it puts in place locally 
to maintain its support. It has been argued that BN’s main electoral 
strength has been its performance in the domestic economy – an issue that 
came under strain under the latter years of the Najib government, as prices 
rose. The attention to the political economy has also raised the theme of 
corruption, which has been the most important reform issue electorally as 
UMNO became more entrenched in “money politics.” The 1MDB scan-
dal and its importance in GE14 is along this vein of analysis. Scholars have 
also highlighted specific policy issues – education, crime, and ethnic rep-
resentation/discrimination – as shaping campaigns as well. This frame-
work has often been applied to specific contexts, used as a heuristic tool 
to describe rich exchange between the government and voters, and simul-
taneously to show how campaigns have evolved from more traditional 
ones tied to labour-intensive mobilisation to more slick modern cam-
paigns with social media narratives and more centralised professional 
management.  
If this third framework is the richest arena of electoral scholarship, 
recent decades have given way to quantitative analysis of voting behaviour. 
The main cleavage has been ethnicity, but studies have also looked at re-
gional and generational patterns of voting (Welsh 2015). This research has 
moved the level of analysis from seats to polling stations, allowing for 
greater depth in findings, and been complemented by the expansion of 
survey research. Below, the analysis draws from this approach – using 
GE14 polling station data – but argues that these heuristic tools for how 
Malaysians voted can be best understood in combination with other 
frameworks.  
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It is the last one that is, perhaps, the least thoroughly explored: atten-
tion to broader socio-political conditions. Early scholarship focused heav-
ily on the urban–rural divide as the defining cleavage of elections, with the 
rural areas favouring BN. This geographic lens has persisted, even with 
Malaysia becoming over 75.5 per cent urbanised by 2017.3 This has been 
reinforced by attention to “safety deposit” (safe) states in East Malaysia. 
GE14 shattered this paradigm. Integrating electoral analysis into other 
broader forces – Islamisation, globalisation – and social cleavages of class 
have received less attention, as society-centred approaches are concen-
trated around quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. Attention to po-
litical literacy is a recent exception (Shamsul 2018). Despite repeated focus 
on the role of religion, little work has been done to look at how religiosity, 
religious education, and religious outlooks shape voting. Instead, religion 
has been equated with issues and the actions of leaders or consequent 
government policies (Rahim 2013; Mohamed 2017). This special issue’s 
focus on civil society is one area where there is a tie between the expansion 
of a liberal reform movement and electoral outcomes. Making the links 
between macro forces and micro dynamics is the thrust of this article, as 
it aims not only to answer the question of why BN was thrown out of 
office but also what longer-term lessons the 2018 election offers for un-
derstanding voting behaviour and democracy in Malaysia.  
5LSHIRU&KDQJH0DOD\VLDLQWKH*OREDO
&RQWH[W
Country analysts often point to the unique political features of a country 
– and Malaysia has many, from its racial and religious political party con-
figuration to its complex regional differences. The GE14 result – one in 
which a more democratic alternative won in the face of greater authoritar-
ian trends – has similarly been explained to date as the result of unique 
local circumstances, especially through the lens of the leadership paradigm 
noted above. A focal point of my argument regarding GE14 is that socio-
political conditions and institutional factors influencing the election were 
strikingly similar to global trends, and ultimately these were the underlying 
drivers to bring about political change in Malaysia. The country’s demo-
cratic breakthrough was, in fact, similar to breaks elsewhere from the 
norm of political arrangements, for example Brexit in the United King-
dom or the election of Donald Trump in the United States. Let us begin 

3  See <www.statista.com/statistics/455880/urbanization-in-malaysia/> (15 De-
cember 2018).  
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with the broader socio-political trends, the necessary conditions noted 
above.  
On the eve of GE14, Malaysia was deeply polarised. For the past 
decade, Malaysians have been sharply divided in their support of the BN 
government (Welsh 2013). The place to see this trend is not in the actual 
results by seats – as Malaysia has a first-past-the-post and highly gerry-
mandered electoral system – but in the popular vote. Since 2008, Malay-
sian voters have been evenly split in support for an opposition alternative 
– with a ratio of 51:48 favouring BN in 2008, and more Malaysians sup-
porting the opposition in 2013 in a ratio of 47:51. The nature of Malaysia’s 
political polarisation has been reinforced by geography, in that BN main-
tained its support in more rural areas and in the East Malaysian states of 
Sabah and Sarawak. Malaysia has had sharp “red” and “blue” divisions 
that have physically showcased these splits, with the opposition particu-
larly winning heavily on the west coast of the Peninsula West Coast. Po-
litical polarisation has served not only to sharpen political divisions within 
Malaysian society, but also to create a competitive electoral contest in 
which small shifts can account for more tectonic movements in the polit-
ical landscape – as occurred in GE14 (and in other breaks such as Brexit 
or the Trump election in 2016). Political polarisation has also enhanced 
zero-sum politics, making elections even more of a one-on-one contest 
despite the involvement of multiple actors. Through the last two elections, 
the core dynamic has been that of retention or removal of BN under Najib 
Tun Razak from power.  
Variation in sources of political information and political attitudes 
have underscored this polarisation. Malaysians who get their political news 
from the previously BN-linked mainstream media have been more loyal 
supporters. Malaysians have not only differed in the support of electoral 
alternatives, but they have sharply differed in three areas: notions of a sec-
ular state, support for democratic values more generally, and views of cor-
ruption. The last two surveys of the Asian Barometer survey data shows 
Malaysians hold different ideological positions across a liberal-conserva-
tive spectrum, and these are reflected in the political support for different 
coalitions – with BN (and the Islamist party PAS in 2018) capturing the 
more conservative views.4 Liberals, however, have supported Pakatan/PH 
in its varied forms since its inception in 2008. One of the most important 
pre-GE14 shifts was the 2015 break-up of Pakatan Rakyat – the opposi-

4  For more details on the Malaysia Asian Barometer Survey, see: <www.asianba 
rometer.org/> (15 December 2018).  
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tion coalition that included PAS, the Chinese-dominant Democratic Ac-
tion Party (DAP), and Anwar Ibrahim’s reformist multi-racial party Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). The reconfiguration of the political opposition 
meant that GE14 was a clear ideological choice for those concerned with 
Islamisation and the empowerment of an Islamist party. This was rein-
forced by the focus on the perceived corruption of the Najib administra-
tion per the 1MDB scandal. This added to the clarity of the choice, making 
GE14 a clear “us versus them” decision that tied into the different ideo-
logical outlooks of Malaysians. Political polarisation thus made for a com-
petitive choice reinforced by rival ideological positions. 
The second defining feature was the rise of anger among Malaysian 
voters. Globally, scholars such as Prakaj Mishra (2017) have described cur-
rent conditions as the “age of anger” in which negative sentiments are 
being driven by a sense of alienation and displacement tied to globalisation. 
He speaks of “ressentiment” – suppressed feelings of envy that are unsatis-
fied – and of religious radicalisation, in which views of victimisation, su-
periority, and intolerance blend together to produce hatred and feed anger. 
In pointing to the tie between globalisation and anger, Misha pinpoints 
these processes as global and divisive. Anger is also seen to be a product 
of perceived abuses of power and position, notably in the form of corrup-
tion.  
GE14 took place in a similar context. After the 2013 election, Najib 
ratcheted up the religious and racial rhetoric – describing that election as 
a “Chinese tsunami” – and persisted in his efforts to paint the opposition 
as Chinese-dominated and a potential threat to Malay political power. Re-
peated incidents heightened ethnic tensions, including differences over the 
(use of the word) “Allah” case in 2015 and polarised views on the need 
for an “Islamic” laundry. Malay chauvinists, under the rubric of “Red 
Shirts,” rallied in confrontational, racialised protests in September 2015 
and then again in August 2016. Reports also showed increased radicalisa-
tion in Malaysian society in support for ISIS and greater terrorist incidents 
since 2016, when a grenade was thrown into a restaurant in Puchong 
(Welsh 2018a). A month before the 2018 election campaign there were 
arrests for a planned attack on a government building in Johore Bharu 
(Nadirah 2018). The Global Terrorism Index 2017 ranks Malaysia as 60th in 
the world in terms of radicalisation, with a steady climb in the past decade 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2017).  
Anger among Malaysians was also stoked over the perceived abuses 
in the 1MDB scandal, first revealed in July 2015. This USD 4.5 billion 
kleptocracy case was one of many revelations of corruption by govern-
ment officials under the Najib administration. Others include allegations 
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of misused funds in government entities such as MARA (McKenzie, Baker, 
and Garnaught 2015) and Tabung Haji (Bernama 2017). This frustration 
with corruption evoked strong reactions both against and in favour of the 
practice. In November 2016, anti-corruption advocates took to the street 
in a rally to protest the perceived abuses. An underlying element of the 
anger involved the ostentatious display of wealth in clothing/accessory 
choices and shopping sprees by the former prime minister and his wife, 
Rosmah Mansor. This “greed” tapped into ressentiment and intensified the 
strong reactions witnessed. Najib and his wife were regularly subjected to 
personal attacks on social media, often responded to through increased 
state repression – a vicious cycle of confrontation and anger thus evolved.  
An important complement to the anger involved increased economic 
vulnerabilities. Malaysia is in the top-tier of countries suffering from ine-
quality in Southeast Asia, and this trend has widened despite steady growth 
and an overall rise in gross domestic product income (Khazanah Research 
Institute 2018). The main problem has been another similarly occurring 
global phenomenon, a decline in social mobility. Growth has not been 
accompanied with parallel job expansion and wage increases. Malaysia has 
a large share of its population – known as the Bottom 40 per cent (B40) – 
living on income levels of less that USD 1,000 a month. At the same time, 
Malaysia experienced record levels of inflation under Najib’s tenure, hit-
ting an annual rate of 3.8 per cent in 2017 and exacerbated by the 2015 
introduction of a goods and services tax (GST) and the poor implementa-
tion of this measure.5 The higher cost of living provoked a tax revolt, feed-
ing into the anger noted above, and exacerbated economic vulnerabilities. 
As developed below, this economic vulnerability was particularly felt by 
younger Malaysians and those with lower incomes, the former group crit-
ical for an electoral victory given their share within overall voters and the 
latter group traditionally forming BN’s political base.  
These socio-political conditions also include a rise in nationalism and 
populist pressures, in keeping with global trends. The nationalist response 
in Malaysia has been both to other countries investing in Malaysia and 
directed towards other ethnic groups within the country itself. The inter-
national dimension includes a strong response against infrastructure in-
vestment by China, as this was seen to be linked to supporting the BN 
government – in that is was perceived to provide funds for making pay-
ments for debts incurred with the 1MDB scandal (Liu and Lim 2018). 
Touted as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, investments in railways 

5  See <www.statista.com/statistics/319033/inflation-rate-in-malaysia/> (15 De-
cember 2018). 
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and roads were seen to be highly politicised, padded with additional costs, 
and to have inadequate spillovers for local suppliers and employment. The 
China factor was, hence, a key campaign issue in GE14 (Wong 2018).  
Another equally important issue, although one less overt in the media, 
was resentment toward the sharp rise in and changing ethnic composition 
of foreign workers. These hires were seen to be tied to corruption within 
the government and evoked reactions among Malaysians who saw the in-
crease of immigrants as changing their country’s social fabric. It was re-
ported that there were six million foreign workers brought into Malaysia 
during the Najib period, out of a total population of 30 million people 
(Lee and Idris, 2018). Foreign workers were perceived to be given voting 
rights in claims of electoral fraud in GE14, an issue that similarly perco-
lated in GE14 (Welsh 2013). The composition of the new immigrants – 
predominantly Muslim – also fed ethnic tensions within Malaysia, as many 
non-Muslims felt displaced. These perceived changes to the social fabric 
of Malaysia came after repeated “shaming” in the international arena for 
the 1MDB scandal, with Najib declared as one of the most corrupt leaders 
in the world by Time magazine in 2016 (Bremmer 2016), and as a result of 
the handling and tragic loss of two Malaysian Airlines – MH370 and 
MH17 in March and July 2014, respectively. Malaysia’s reputation on the 
international stage thus took a beating, which contrasted sharply with the 
build-up of the country’s standing under the first Mahathir era.  
Nationalism also took on a local character, with regional pressures in 
both Sarawak and Sabah contributing to opposition to BN – as discussed 
elsewhere in this special issue. The political use of Malay chauvinism also 
reinforced the reaction of non-Malays against BN, a pattern that had been 
in place since 2008. In GE14, based on polling station results, 91 per cent 
of Chinese and 72 per cent of Indians voted against BN – up from 83 per 
cent and 60 per cent in GE13, respectively. The hardening of the non-
Malays against the government can be seen to be, in part, tied to the use 
of ethnic nationalism to maintain loyalties within BN’s political base as 
part of the country’s ongoing political polarisation. Local nationalist sen-
timents fed anger as well.  
It is thus not a surprise, given these socio-political conditions, that 
populism came to the fore. BN and Pakatan Rakyat were locked in fierce 
competition for electoral support after 2008. It was Pakatan who initially 
introduced measures that were seen to attract votes, subsidies, and other 
“goodies” as part of their alternative budget. These populist measures 
gained traction in GE13, with the government offering a politicised cash 
transfer programme, Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia or BR1M, and a litany of 
special subsidies. The BN government’s revenue advantage gave it a 
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stronger position in winning support in 2013, assisted in part with the 
slush funding from 1MDB for electoral use (Welsh 2013). In 2018, the 
opposition parties continued to push populist initiatives, calling for an end 
to the GST and an expansion of social safety nets – with BN repeating its 
electoral wooing with long lists of promises in its various electoral mani-
festos.  
GE14 increasingly took on other dimensions of populism as well, as 
both Najib and Mahathir personified their leadership as “defending the 
people” and “saving the country.” In fact, Mahathir’s (re-)entry into poli-
tics was labelled a “Saving Malaysia” initiative, being launched in March 
2016 and with this theme then anchoring his campaign in GE14. The rise 
of saviour populist politics can recently be found in Mexico and Brazil, as 
individuals tie their leadership to that of the people as part of a populist 
strategy to win support (Economist 2018). In Malaysia’s case, Mahathir em-
braced his well-honed nationalist credentials, strong record of economic 
performance, and vast experience so as to take on this role.  
(QRXJK:DV(QRXJK0RELOLVDWLRQRIDQ
(PRWLRQDO1DUUDWLYH
Political polarisation, anger, economic vulnerability, nationalism, and pop-
ulism were integral socio-political features contextualising GE14. These 
alone were not adequate to bring about a political transition, however. The 
first major sufficient factor involved a nexus of modern campaigning, so-
cial media expansion, and emotion. As outlined in this special issue, social 
media – both Facebook and WhatsApp – played a major role in mobilising 
voters. Rather than serving as an equaliser – a tool for the ordinary mobi-
lisation of the “weak,” as argued – I emphasise instead how social media 
enhanced the role that emotion played in GE14. 
Studies of political psychology have been highlighting the role of 
emotions in election campaigns for over a decade (Rico, Guinjoan, and 
Anduiza 2017; Brader 2006). The research began with the study of emo-
tional appeals in television advertisements. These were seen to provoke 
two different reactions: enthusiasm and fear. Traditional research argued 
that the effects from adverts were primarily epiphenomenal, geared to-
ward arousal/attention-seeking and a matter of valence (triggering positive 
or negative responses to one candidate or another). Scholarship has since 
challenged these initial findings to suggest that emotions are, in fact, an 
integral part of voting behaviour, and often critical in decision-making 
processes – especially for less educated voters. Advertising uses symbol-
ism that include specific cues that capitalise on learned behaviour. The 
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visual, non-verbal dimensions are especially important, in that they impact 
behaviour inadvertently.  
More recent research has integrated the role of social media, and its 
synergies with political advertising/campaigns. The Brexit and Trump 
campaigns, for example, have provoked research into how voters were 
influenced, especially after the revelations that automated Twitter ac-
counts and targeted algorithms on Facebook (prepared by private compa-
nies such as Cambridge Analytica in collaboration with access to user data) 
were used (Barlett 2018; Economist 2017; Persily 2017). This research has 
pointed to the mobilisation role of anger, and to a lesser extent anxiety. It 
has also highlighted the role of humour in stimulating responses and evok-
ing support. What has distinguished the emotional appeal diffused 
through social media is the trust networks that the messages have been 
built on, as well as the ability to target messages to specific individuals 
using algorithms measuring political leanings from their use of social me-
dia accounts and the Internet (Barlett 2018). These patterns of use of so-
cial media are known to the companies using the algorithms and hard to 
predict given their “emotive” and personal qualities, as they are not cap-
tured in polling – and thus, when they are eventually revealed in voting, 
they come as a “surprise.” 
Historically, emotion has always been important in Malaysian elec-
tions. It is not new, even if it has remained buried as an analytical tool. 
Fear has been a consistent element in BN campaigns. A famous example 
is that of the use of images of terrorist attacks in the Sarawak 2001 state 
elections to discredit the opposition. In GE13, the message of Malay eth-
nic political displacement was repeatedly used to scare voters so as to 
maintain support for BN (Welsh 2013). Anger was mobilised in the 1999 
campaign too, as Mahathir was attacked for his treatment of then opposi-
tion leader Anwar Ibrahim. GE13 also aimed to capture hope and enthu-
siasm in the “festival” celebratory rallies calling for change. Ironically, the 
large numbers of Chinese Pakatan supporters in the crowds were used to 
provoke fear among BN’s political base, that feared a displacement of Ma-
lay rule, and contributed to BN retaining power in 2013. There is no short-
age of political use of emotions in Malaysian electoral campaigns.  
This tactic was especially effective in GE14. PH launched clear and 
consistent attacks on Najib – calling him a bandit, liar, and crook (penyagak, 
penipu, and penyamum). These terms capitalised on anger. At the same time, 
Mahathir used emotional appeals – taking his weakness (then being 92 
years of age) as, in fact, a strength, to build up a sense of sacrifice so as to 
enhance his “saviour” role. An emotional video, explaining why Mahathir 
was returning to politics and running for office, shot of him speaking to 
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children contained multiple symbolic cues – from music to the use of 
tears.6 Mahathir also painted himself as the person under attack, with 
claims that his campaign was being sabotaged – and thus further evoking 
sympathy and anger. Who goes after a 92-year-old man? Mahathir was 
portrayed as the hero, while Najib was the villain; Mahathir was couched 
as the national protector, Najib as shameful (along with his portrayed 
“greedy” wife). Similar ‘emotion-laiden’ videos were used to promote Sa-
bah state nationalism, as themes of displacement and unfairness were 
highlighted.7 The behaviour of the BN-friendly Election Commission was 
also drawn on so as to arouse anger, as disqualifications, perceived unfair 
treatment of prospective candidates, and the destruction of campaign 
posters for having Mahathir’s photograph on them reinforced a sense that 
“enough was enough” and this was all an outrage (Lee 2018) – or as de-
scribed to imply disgust in Malay, “menyampah.”  
These messages were forwarded within trusted networks. Not only 
did they serve to stoke anger, they also reduced the effectiveness of the 
BN campaign – as shared communities instilled trust and confidence to 
engage in risk-taking, to vote for change. Social media had more coverage 
in GE14 than at any previous point in Malaysian history. As such, these 
affective messages had a greater effect. Without the socio-political context 
outlined earlier, they would not have been as successful however. The 
ground for an emotional break campaign was fertile and viable. Ultimately, 
PH’s proved effective.  
'HDWKE\0'%&XWV$Q80127VXQDPL
A broadly held view of GE14 is that political loyalties among Malays 
changed. Described as a “Malay tsunami,” the election is painted as an 
important change in ethnic support (Liew 2018).8 This interpretation fits 
with the dominant ethnic voting behaviour paradigm noted earlier. As a 
picture, it is simplistic – as it essentialises the Malay community, and does 
not adequately account for variation within that community as a whole. I 
argue that the second decisive factor was, in fact, a change in UMNO’s 

6  The video can be found online at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=XzXWBL 
DstJw> (15 December 2018).  
7  The video can be found online at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=jeiuPHHM 
qmk> (15 December 2018). 
8  The speech given by member of parliament Liew Chin Tong at the Australian 
National University in October 2018 can be seen here: <www.facebook.com/ 
liewchintong.my/posts/game-changerthe-may-9th-election-outcome-was-only-
possible-because-statesmen-suc/10155796914835911/> (15 December 2018). 
  98 Bridget Welsh 

political base, a defection within UMNO’s Malay political ground that had 
been evolving for over a decade. It coincided with the deinstitutionalisa-
tion of UMNO that was exacerbated by Najib’s poor leadership. 
The common understanding of the erosion of support for UMNO is 
to focus on elite splits, specifically the negative impact that the 2016 purge 
of UMNO leaders who opposed Najib over his handling of the 1MDB 
scandal had on the party. It is this purge that led to the ousting of former 
deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, former prime minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, and of other leaders from UMNO, contributing to the for-
mation of a new Malay-based party Party Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Ma-
laysian United Indigenous Party, or Bersatu) (Lemiere 2018). This party 
attracted former UMNO members, and served as the vehicle for Mahathir 
to assume the position of prime minister-designate within PH. Elite splits 
have long been used to explain why dominant political parties collapse and 
authoritarian regimes change (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986). 
It is, thus, not a surprise that this framework would be applied in Malay-
sia’s political transition.  
While not discounting the impact of elite division, I argue this does 
not adequately capture the underlying forces that contributed to both the 
elite split and changes in the support from the historical political base. For 
this, it is necessary to look at what happened within UMNO post-Ma-
hathir’s first era and, in particular, during Najib’s tenure. UMNO experi-
enced a deinstitutionalisation, in which the party organs and traditional 
patronage networks weakened (Welsh 2016). There was a failure of party 
reform and checks within the party itself to prevent abuses by Najib’s cor-
rupt leadership. Najib also failed to effectively rebrand the party (Welsh 
2018c). When it opted to ally itself with PAS, Malaysia’s Islamist party, in 
GE14 and the 2016 elite split occurred, this opened up the floodgates for 
desertion from UMNO’s traditional supporters looking for a Malay ‘fa-
miliar’ alternative. GE14 should thus be seen as a UMNO tsunami, as 
changes in voting patterns point to a decimation of the party’s political 
base. 
In measuring the scope of UMNO’s erosion of support, I concen-
trate on traditional seats – its “electoral core” or the constituencies that 
the party had held for since independence. I trace the support patterns 
over the last five elections (1999, 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2018). I begin with 
the 1999 election as this witnessed a large spilt in the Malay vote and 
UMNO’s greatest number of losses in recent decades.. There are two 
groups of seats: those that the party maintained in GE14 (35) and those 
that the party lost (21), almost a quarter of the entire seats contested in 
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GE14.9 The findings show that UMNO’s decline has been ongoing, rather 
than only occurring in GE14. Table 1 below shows that since 2008 the 
party has lost 30.7 per cent of its support, close to a third. Half of this 
erosion occurred before GE14. Most of the losses are concentrated during 
Najib’s tenure, 20.3 per cent. Undisputedly, the loss of 21 UMNO seats 
was critical in the final GE14 outcome – as PH’s majority is only 10 seats, 





1999 2004 2008 2013 2018 
Base Retained 62.0% 72.1% 64.9% 62.7% 49.9% 
Base Lost 66.2% 75.6% 66.1% 58.4% 37.7% 












Base Retained 9.5% -9.1% -2.7% -12.9% 
Base Lost 9.3% -11.5% -7.2% -17.9% 
Average 9.40% -10.30% -4.95% -15.40% 
 
UMNO’s deinstitutionalisation involves three factors: weaker party insti-
tutions, stymied reform, and failed rebranding. Founded in 1946, UMNO 
has long been touted as one of the strongest parties in Asia, with a robust 
patronage base and extensive community ties between the party and the 
electorate (Slater 2012; Slater and Fenner 2011). Most scholars trace 
changes within UMNO to the first Mahathir era, when the party expanded 
its involvement in the economy and became more centralised (Funston 
2016). The rise of corruption – or money politics – resulted in a focus of 
the party on its elites rather than on its members as a whole, and shifts in 
patronage patterns, while the concentration of power reinforced already 
strong feudal and centralised tendencies within the party. The Najib era 
would exacerbate these practices further. As party president, Najib con-
trolled not only political appointments but also centralised patronage 
around himself as both prime minister and finance minister (Gomez 2017). 
He appointed loyalists to key party organs, and rather than distribute pat-
ronage through these he created parallel processes using his control of the 
state (Welsh 2016). Patronage moved from party coffers to government 
funds, in the cash transfer programme 1Malaysia People’s Aid (Bantuan 

9  For more details of the specific seats, see Welsh (2018).  
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Rakyat 1Malaysia or BR1M), for example, and became more concentrated 
directly within the prime minister’s office as opposed to through an array 
of political bodies. On the ground, party organs were starved of funds and 
became increasingly irrelevant – that as their dependence on the political 
favour of the party’s centralised leadership increased.  
Internal pressures to change UMNO were also thwarted, as party 
elections were heavily manipulated in 2013 through the use of money – 
and delayed altogether until after GE14. This prevented conflicts within 
the party from being resolved, and resulted in infighting within UMNO 
on the ground – contributing to its losses electorally, especially in the states 
of Kedah, Terengganu, and Sabah (Welsh 2018c). Najib maintained power 
through his control of party elites particularly at the division level, losing 
touch with members who increasingly were unable to have a voice within 
the party itself and who were frustrated by their exclusion. The 1MDB 
crisis only served to reinforce the centralised control over the party rather 
than to allow reform and greater representation from within. The party 
was unable to correct the abuses of power internally.  
To compensate for increased dissent within the party and the ongo-
ing political erosion of support, Najib engaged in a rebranding of the party 
– aiming to make UMNO more Islamic and thus to woo supporters from 
its traditional foe, PAS (Welsh 2018c). He began to connect the party with 
PAS’s Islamic agenda, opening away for the perceived close ties of the 
parties in GE14. He simultaneously adopted a rigid Malay chauvinist po-
sition that undercut the party’s relationship with its non-Malay partners 
within BN. The end result in making the party more Islamic was that it 
served to make PAS more attractive to party members, as UMNO was no 
longer a more liberal alternative. As UMNO became more Malay chauvin-
ist, it also lost ground as the party representing the middle ground of out-
reach to non-Malay parties (Welsh 2018d). These shifts contributed to the 
losses of the party over the longer-term, and can be seen in the GE14 
results. UMNO lost political support among Malays, only capturing an 
estimated 44.5 per cent of their vote in GE14 compared to 61.4 per cent 
in GE13.10 The party was no longer able to connect to its base, its mem-
bers/supporters were increasingly alienated by stymied reform, and many 
Malays within UMNO no longer saw the party as a national one capable 
of representing the country as a whole. They left, opting for both PAS 

10  This is based on a national polling station analysis. Voter data is organised around 
streams capturing when voters register and thus are a proxy for age. The electoral 
roll also lists years of birth so these sources of information can be used to assess 
generation voting using ecological inference.  
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(which captured an estimated 31.7 per cent of Malay voters) and to a lesser 
extent, PH (at an estimated 23.3 per cent of Malay support). 
<RXWK6XSSRUW7KH³&KDQJH´*HQHUDWLRQ
One particular group that never came to the party in the necessary num-
bers for UMNO’s (and BN’s) positive political fortunes in GE14 were 
young people. As shown in Table 2 below, voters under the age of 40 
comprised over 43.6 per cent of the electorate in GE14 – some 6.4 million 
of the 13.9 million voters. Voters under 30 were a quarter of the electorate. 
The analysis examining patterns of voting in lower streams (saluran) of re-
sults shows that young people did not vote for BN in GE14 as they had 
in the past, with BN only capturing 28.4 per cent of voters under 30 and 
29.2 per cent of those aged 31 to 40. The younger the voters, the larger 
the alienation from BN. The vote share declined 17.1 per cent and 15 per 
cent from 2013 in the respective age groups. Estimated turnout among 
young people also declined as well, from 83 per cent to 79 per cent, but 
the overall impact of younger voter participation was large enough to be 
decisive in the results. A significant share of the vote swing in GE14 can 
be seen to be tied to the shift among young voters alone. 
7DEOH%1(OHFWRUDO7XUQRXWDQG6XSSRUWE\$JHLQ*(DQG*(
Age Group 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 Above 
60 
Share Voters 20.2% 23.4% 20.1% 17.8% 18.5% 
2013 Turnout 83.2% 83.5% 84.7% 85.9% 81.3% 
2018 Turnout  79.0% 79.4% 82.1% 84.5% 79.5% 
2013 BN Share 45.5% 44.2% 48.0% 45.3% 48.6% 
2018 BN Share 28.4% 29.2% 34.6% 33.7% 39.3% 
Change Vote Share 
GE13 to GE14  
-17.10% -15.00% -13.40% -11.60% -9.30% 
 
Why did the young not support the incumbent government? The reasons 
for this can be tied to the broader socio-political forces noted earlier: 
namely, increased economic vulnerability among young people and the 
deinstitutionalisation of UMNO as well as its coalition partners within BN 
in its engagement with these younger voters.  
Younger Malaysians are on the frontline of the negative implications 
of reduced social mobility. International Labour Organization estimates 
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suggest that youth unemployment reached 10.8 per cent in 2017, margin-
ally increasing over the past three years.11 While these numbers are much 
lower than those in other world regions, Malaysia’s youth unemployment 
rate is one of the highest in Asia. Unemployment is particularly concen-
trated among those young people who are supposed to be rising econom-
ically, university graduates. Nearly a third of university graduates are esti-
mated to be unemployed, highlighting a mismatch between their ambi-
tions and the actual marketplace (Halim 2018). This lack of employment 
among graduates also highlights the challenges of social mobility among 
young people.  
Youth economic vulnerability is not just a matter of employment, it 
is also tied to the cost of living and to wages. Studies show that wage 
growth in Malaysia is low, especially for young people who are hired in 
entry-level positions (Chong and Khong 2017). In the past decade there 
has been no real growth in entry salary wages, while cost of living has 
increased sharply. Young people also comprise a large share of Malaysia’s 
B40, those in the bottom income percentiles. The impact of higher costs 
of living is thus particularly acute for young people. Like youth elsewhere, 
young Malaysians cannot afford to purchase housing at the same level as 
compared to older generations and cannot expect to attain the same stand-
ard of living as their parents. With the 2015 introduction of the GST, and 
the resulting inflation, BN set itself up for the erosion of its support 
among young people – as shown in the election results.  
Economic factors cannot be seen in isolation from political ones, 
namely the weaknesses vis-à-vis youth engagement on the part of BN 
(Welsh 2018b). In GE14, BN lost the comparative populist advantage in 
engaging youth – especially urban youth. The dominant BN paradigm was 
to focus on opportunities, with an emphasis on jobs and training. This was 
coupled with improving facilities for sports and education. With deterio-
rating economic conditions perceived among youth, BN’s economic pro-
gramme had less resonance. It contrasted unfavourably with PH’s call for 
free higher education and a review of still outstanding unpaid scholarship 
repayments. At the same time, PH fielded younger people in higher num-
bers, with a number of prominent young candidates such as Syed Saddiq. 
While youth voter registration dropped overall, the BN party organs had 
failed to register younger voters, compared to earlier levels and to PH. Not 
to be left out from our understanding of the shift in support is also the 
impact of the emotions generated in the social media campaigning noted 

11  See <www.statista.com/statistics/812222/youth-unemployment-rate-in-malay-
sia/> (15 December 2018). 
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above. Younger voters disproportionately obtain their information from 
social media. The impact of this was that when GE14 arrived, the youth 




In understanding the GE14 results, my argument has pointed to the cen-
tral role of emotions in a more modern campaign, deinstitutionalisation 
within UMNO, and an erosion of youth support. These factors cannot be 
understood in isolation from broader socio-political conditions: political 
polarisation, increase of anger, greater economic vulnerability, and the rise 
of nationalism and populism. The combination of micro developments 
tied to broader macro conditions resulted in the political transition wit-
nessed.  
While not discounting alternative explanations – the role of leader-
ship and opposition pacts in particular – this analysis suggests we need to 
more fully incorporate a broader understanding of socio-political changes 
regarding voting behaviour. Emotional campaigning would not have been 
so effective without the rise of anger and nationalism. The deinstitution-
alisation of UMNO would similarly not have been so impactful without 
failures to meet populist expectations within the party and the backlash 
effect of moving it towards more conservative Islamic and also exclusion-
ary racist political ground. Finally, youth disenchantment with BN must 
be seen as tied to rising economic vulnerabilities. None of the shifts would 
not have been as significant without the deeply entrenched political polar-
isation or zero-sum character of Malaysian politics on the eve of GE14. 
The prominent role of affect, and changes within UMNO as well as among 
youth, combined to facilitate a political transition.  
Analytically, my combination of socio-political conditions with more 
micro developments within the campaign and with patterns of voting be-
haviour suggests that understanding elections in Malaysia and GE14 spe-
cifically requires moving out of rigid frameworks focused on leadership. 
A shift away from narrow dominant explanations that look at ethnic vot-
ing and coalition choices is necessary, too. There is a need to appreciate 
emotions, longer-term changes within political parties, and demographic 
shifts. In short we need to see Malaysian elections as shaped as much out-
side of the campaign period itself as within it.  
This attention to the factors contributing to “saviour politics” and 
the return of Mahathir as prime minister suggest that Malaysia is not 
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unique in being shaped by global trends. Ironically given Mahathir’s role 
in Malaysian political history, GE14 was a break from the past, rather than 
an emphatic national embrace of a democratic future. While democracy 
has expanded as a result of the victory of more liberal parties in a coalition 
and a turnover of government, this development has been driven by sim-
ilar forces that are breaking the mould of incumbent patterns of leadership 
elsewhere too. The factors themselves also suggest that Malaysia’s new 
government will also face considerable challenges. Emotional appeals can 
fade quickly if not replaced by more concrete and substantive engagement. 
A weaker UMNO does not point to a constructive opposition, and is an 
unhealthy element in a democracy. And, the power of youth electorally 
highlights the need for meaningful engagement and changes in policy out-
comes that meet the expectations of this “change generation.” The young 
expect deliverables, especially in the economy. Greater democracy in Ma-
laysia has demands to rapidly address; not least among these are the bur-
dens caused by the anger and political polarisation that BN left behind. 
Lessons from Latin America have shown that “saviours” face difficult 
times ahead, and are constrained by both the leaders elected and their 
management of the socio-political conditions that they inherit. In this vein, 
Mahathir’s return comes with high expectations and faces significant ob-
stacles. Saving Malaysia will thus involve moving beyond the efforts of 
one man, to tackle the underlying socio-political conditions – especially 
anger and economic vulnerabilities. Anything less will mean that Malay-
sia’s democratic expansion will itself be under possible threat from a new 
saviour, potentially tapping again into anger and capitalising on more con-
servative and authoritarian forces that remain an important part of Malay-
sia’s political socio-political fabric.  
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